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TELEVISED TRIALS IN ILLINOIS: SHOULD IT BE
VIEWED AS A PRIVACY QUESTION?
The debate over televised coverage of courtroom proceedings in
Illinois continues. For most states, the question of the propriety of
media coverage involved a weighing of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, the right to a public trial, and the right
to a fair trial. Although some courts have recognized the right of
privacy in this context, the trial participant's privacy interest has
been regarded as "a weak reed to rely upon to prevent a telecast of
a trial."' Given the broad scope of disclosure inherent in broadcasting, however, it is necessary to reevaluate the trial participant's
right of privacy.
The Illinois Supreme Court should examine the right of privacy along with the right of free press, the right to a public trial,
and the right to a fair trial when it makes its decisions concerning
the appropriateness of televised trial proceedings. Recently, in In
re Photographing,Broadcasting,and Televising Proceedingsin Illinois Courts,2 the court, in aligning with a majority of states, lifted
its ban on courtroom photography and authorized experimental
broadcast coverage of appellate level proceedings for one year. The
sharply divided court did not, however, extend broadcast coverage
to the trial level.3 Now that the experimental period has expired,
the court is expected to reconsider the issue of whether to authorized televised trials.
Prior to the court's latest pronouncement in this area, it had
held that cameras should not be permitted in the courtroom because their presence was "not in keeping with the dignity a court
should maintain."'4 Following the United States Supreme Court's5
sanctioning of cameras in the courtroom in Chandler v. Florida,
however, the trend among states has been to allow cameras in the
courtroom at the trial level.6 Indeed, even the Illinois Supreme
Court has noted that, with the advent of substantial technological
advancements in the communications industry, some of its previous
1. Yesawich, Televising and BroadcastingTrials, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 701, 712
(1952).
2. 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA) 2634 (1983).
3. Id.
32, 67, 117 N.E. 286, 300 (1917).
4. People v. Munday, 280 Ill.
5. 449 U.S. 560 (1981).
6. See Graves, Camerasin the Courts: The Situation Today, 63 JUDICATURE
24 (1979).
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concerns had been limited or reduced substantially. 7
It has long been recognized that the use of the news camera,
which is able to capture one's image and transmit it for the benefit
of a mass audience, poses an especially oppressive threat to the individual's 'privacy interests. Nonetheless, most courts have refused to
recognize the individual's right of privacy during a trial because the
information published is considered to be public information.8 The
underlying rationale is that, because the published information is
part of the trial record, which is open to the public, it was never
private. This reasoning, however, fails to take into account that
much of what goes on during a trial receives little attention in standard news coverage and is not expressed in the trial record.
Moreover, courts have analogized camera coverage to newspaper coverage in ruling that the individual does not have a right of
privacy during a trial. 9 The qualitative differences between television coverage and newspaper coverage, however, make television
coverage sui generis. The auditory impact and the visual delivery
of television clearly exceed that of newsprint because they allow
the viewer to receive a constant and thorough inspection of the trial
participants. Thus, there exists the "potential for intimate closeups and widespread exposure of not only the name of the [participants], but of their faces and features, emotions, and possibly even
their private thoughts."' 0
Not only must the participant be subjected to a serious assault
upon his privacy interest during the trial, he may also be subjected
to the unavoidable notoriety that accompanies the media's promotional messages. It is this type of extensive and unwarranted disclosure that the right of privacy was intended to protect.'" Hence, the
uniqueness of television coverage of trials and its attendant media
hype, require a reevaluation of the trial participant's right of
privacy.
This reconsideration is especially appropriate in light of the
fact that the participants in a trial attend for various reasons and in
various circumstances. Some appear willingly; others appear under
compulsion of a court order. For some, such as judges and court
personnel, the trial may represent a test of their detachment and
objectivity. For others, the trial may represent intense, private
7. In re Photographing,2634, at 12 (Simon, J., concurring).

8. Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467, 468 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Berg v. Minneapolis Star and Tribune, 79 F. Supp. 957, 960 (D. Minn. 1948).
9. Comment, Televised Trials: Constitutional Constraints,Practical Im-

plications,and State Experimentation, 9 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 910, 914 (1978).
10. Boone, TV in the Courtroom: Is Something Being Stolen From US?, 9
HUM. RS. 24, 27 (1981).
11. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193, 204
(1890).
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grief, shame or fear. Regardless of one's personal stake in the outcome, the presence of the television camera only serves to augment
the existing high level of intense emotion. In addition, a witness' or
juror's reticence, whether originating from reclusiveness or from
fear of reprisals, may be severe and possibly debilitating to the trial.
This behavior can only undermine the goals of efficient and fair judicial administration.
Because the courts have the responsibility to supervise all aspects of the trial, they must ensure that camera exposure does not
subject trial participants to privacy invasions beyond what is inherent in a traditional public trial. Admittedly, private individuals
thrust into the public domain must relinquish some expectation of
privacy in favor of the public's right to be informed of newsworthy
events. This does not mean, however, that the individual's privacy
rights must be cast aside to make room for television cameras. In
fact, most courts have recognized that, in situations involving sex
crime victims, children, informants, and undercover police officers,
the trial judge may, in his discretion, exclude spectators from the
courtroom if necessary to prevent embarassment or emotional dis12
turbance of a trial participant.
Although the public's right of access is not absolute, the individual's right of privacy is likewise subject to restraints. Privacy
interests, especially in what has traditionally been considered a
public forum, must yield to other compelling constitutional considerations such as the right of free press, the right to a public trial,
and the right to a fair trial. Therefore, it is necessary to balance
these considerations in conjunction with the indispensible right of
privacy in determining the permissible extent of invasion of one's
privacy interests during a televised trial. On balance, however, the
scale tips in favor of permitting televised trials.
The implementation of televised trials need not force jurors,
witnesses, litigants, or other participants to endure a serious assault
upon their privacy interests in order to accommodate other competing constitutional considerations. Because cameras in the courtroom present a unique threat to a trial participant's right of privacy,
the Illinois Supreme Court, if it decides to implement camera coverage at the trial level, should adopt a limited access plan that will
preserve the individual's privacy interests during a televised trial.
No other result can protect and preserve the trial participant's
human dignity.
William J. Arendt
12. 75 AM. JUR. 2d Trial § 146 (1974); R. HUNTER, FEDERAL TRIAL HANDBOOK § 7.9, at 72 (1st ed. 1974).

